Incorporating Error Detection in an RSA Architecture

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Outline

- Introduction
  - Motivation and objectives

- RSA
  - The Algorithm
  - The Basic Architecture

- Online detection
  - Code generation
  - Prediction
  - Verification

- Results
  - Overheads and error coverage

- Concluding remarks

Motivation

- Boneh et al. have shown successful attacks against RSA
  - CRT-based implementations can be broken with a single faulty signature
  - Other implementations can also be attacked, although more fault injections are necessary

- Countermeasures
  - Random multiplicative masking on modulus allows cross checking in CRT-RSA (Shamir)
  - Additional modular code is propagated through the encryption process (Walter @ CHES 2000)

Objectives

- Implementation of an RSA architecture
  - The reference model was presented by Mazzeo et al. at DATE '03

- Extension of the architecture with error detection capabilities

- Evaluation of the actual overheads (area and latency)

- Validation of the estimated coverage for transient faults

The RSA Cryptosystem

+ Message is encrypted/decrypted by modular exponentiation

$$m^e \bmod N \qquad\qquad m = (m^e)^d \bmod N$$

+ Parameters:
  + N is the public modulus ($N=p*q$)
  + p and q are large primes
  + m is the message
  + e is the public exponent
  + d is the private exponent, satisfying $d*e = 1 \bmod (p-1)(q-1)$

+ A faulty signature allows to factor the modulus N easily (and thus recover the private key)

The Basic RSA Architecture

- It works in the **Montgomery domain**

- Operations computed using a **32-bit** Processing Element (PE)

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Online Detection

- A residue code can detect errors in the computation

- Three components are needed:
    - Code generation unit
    - Prediction rules, to keep the check bits consistent with data
    - Checkpoint, to validate the predicted check bits

- Residues fit modular arithmetic very well
    - The result check bits of any operation can be easily obtained from the check bits of the operands

- The use of the residue code must be transparent to the user
    - Interaction with device stays the same

Code Generation

- The code/word size ratio is 1:8

- Carry-Save layer minimizes carry propagation delay

- Carry-Select Adder computes final check bits with no further modular reduction

Code Prediction

Fetch operands Compute Write

Time

First word

Second word

…

Last (most significant) word

Code word

Memory words

Correction is sometimes required

Code Verification

- Read requests are verified before revealing memory content
  - Starting address must be the least significant word

- Memory word are internally read, and actual code is computed
  - The number of reads depends on the operand size (768 up to 2048 bits)

- Last word read gives the predicted code, which can be verified against the actual code

- If verification is positive, then the read process is started again from the initial address, and data is sent to output

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Code Verification

Ready → *Read request* → **Read next word** → **Update Check bits** → ◇ *Most significant word?*

N (from Most significant word?) loops back to Read next word

Y → **Retrieve predicted Check bits** → ◇ *Does prediction match?*

N → Ready

Y → **Start read again** → **Read next word** → **Output word** → ◇ *Most significant word?*

Y → Ready

N → Read next word

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Latency Overheads

- Operand loading: one idle cycle per operand is required to let the device initialize the code
  - **Last written word must be the most significant one**

- Computation: only one clock cycle per PE operation
  - **This holds for any operand size**

- Result verification: reading takes twice longer

- Operation times for the basic and the error detecting designs:

Operand Size	Exponentiation Time (*clock cycles,* [M])		
	Basic	Error Detecting	Overhead (%)
768	30.18	31.07	+2.94
1024	66.68	68.27	+2.38
1536	207.09	210.66	+1.72
2048	469.59	475.94	+1.35

Area Overheads

Unit	Core Unit (μm^2)	Memory (μm^2)
Basic Version	**140,000**	**585,000**
Code Generator	18,900	-
Code Generator + Validation Unit	47,000	-
Error detecting version	**193,000**	**615,000**

Overall area increase:

+11 %

Error Coverage

- Errors are injected into the word read from memory

- Coverage Test: Transient random fault
  - Random 16-bit value injected once at random times

				X			

  - 100% detection rate out of hundreds of tests

- Undetected faults: Transient double faults
  - Random 16-bit value injected once in **two different 16-bit blocks** of the same word at a random time

		X					X

  - 0% detection rate (as expected)

Further Improvements

- Larger code
  - Overhead increase is negligible but coverage improves
  - Upper bound is PE size (32 bits)

- Embedding the code into the most significant word
  - Code size is slightly less than PE size
  - No latency overhead in code prediction
  - No memory overhead
  - Code correction term is still needed

- Optimized unit for code correction
  - Actually a simpler adder since the second operand is known a priori (± the base of the code, i.e., +65535 or -65535)

- Optimized code verification unit
  - Second-phase reading involves address computation

Conclusions

- Error detecting code can be a viable solution even for an area-constrained architecture

- Latency overhead is negligible
  - It can be considerably reduced after optimization

- Area overhead is reasonable
  - Most additional area is required by the code validation unit

- Error coverage depends on the code size and is customizable

- Designed for regular RSA
  - It can work for CRT-RSA also