

Robust Finite Field Arithmetic for Fault-Tolerant Public-Key Cryptography



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Agenda

- Observations and Motivation
- Need for fault tolerance
- Introduction to homomorphic embeddings
- Error model
- Previous ideas, their flaws, and improvements
- Relation to Coding Theory



Some Observations and Motivation

- Current cryptographic key sizes are “computationally secure”
- But: real and tangible threat from side-channel attacks
- Passive attacks have been sufficiently covered in the literature
- Active attacks may prove to be more difficult to defend against
- Need for robust cryptosystems
- How do you prevent somebody from driving a spike (electrical/mechanical) through your chip?



The Famous CRT Attack on RSA

- Bellcore attacks: Boneh, et al. 1996:
Introduce arbitrary fault into one of the exponentiations, compute $\text{GCD}(S-S', N) = p \rightarrow$ Modulus is factored.
- Similar attacks on other signature schemes
- Shamir's countermeasure does not always help [BOS02]
- Raised awareness of necessity to verify signature before returning result.
- Problem: How to tell if something went wrong without verifying the signature?
- Need for lightweight fault-tolerance measures to add robustness to finite field arithmetic



Fault Tolerance requires Error Correction

- Need to introduce redundancy into system
- Use meaningful, i.e. large distance, redundancy to spot errors and/or correct them (i.e. codes!)
- Fundamentally different error model: Malicious adversary vs. binary symmetric channel
- Also: computation instead of transmission
- How do we compute with encoded values? Operations need to be preserved
- (Hint: Cyclic and Arithmetic codes possess an arithmetic structure).



Some more Observations

- Underlying arithmetic structure of public key cryptosystems are finite fields, either prime (RSA, DH, ECC) or extension fields (ECC)
- Cyclic and arithmetic codes use similar finite field arithmetic
- Can we make use of finite field structures to achieve fault-tolerance?
- Idea: Homomorphic Embedding using scaling techniques




Homomorphic Embedding


- Use homomorphism to embed field elements into larger (i.e. redundant) ring:
 - Perform all computations in ring w/ redundancy
 - Homomorphism ensures that field operations are preserved in ring as long as there is no fault
 - Faults can be detected after each atomic operation
 - Decode the final result only at the very end if no errors have occurred in any step
- Transformation function $\phi : \mathcal{F} \rightarrow \mathcal{G}$ for elements $a, b \in \mathcal{F}$:
- Preserves additive identity: $\phi(0) = 0$
- Preserves addition: $\phi(a) + \phi(b) = \phi(a+b)$
- Preserves multiplication: $\phi(a \cdot b) = \phi(a) \cdot \phi(b)$
- Does not necessarily preserve multiplicative inverse

Two strategies

1. $|F| \geq |G|$



2. $|F| < |G|$





Practical Homomorphisms

- Extension fields: $\square: \text{GF}(q^m) \rightarrow \text{GF}((q^m)^n)$
 - “Natural embedding”
 - Too restrictive to be practical (huge overhead for $n > 2$)
- Ring homomorphisms:
 - Prime field into integer ring: $\text{GF}(q) \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$
 - Extension field into polynomial ring: $\text{GF}(q^m) \rightarrow \text{GF}(q)[x]$
- Homomorphism ensures that ring operations preserve field operations
- Perform all necessary operations in the ring, then transform the result back
- Important: Choose homomorphism with “useful” redundancy, i.e. no naïve embedding



Scaled embedding

- Idea loosely based on modulus scaling $m=p \cdot s$
- Scaling of field elements with generator value g : $\phi(a)=g \cdot a \in R$
- Goal: Partition the ring into cosets of which only one contains valid symbols
- Error detection by checking for membership
- Scaling factor s determines amount of redundancy $r=\log_2 s$ and form of effective ring modulus
 $m = q \cdot s$
- Choose s such that m has pseudo-Mersenne form $2^n \pm u$ (prime fields) or $x^n \pm u(x)$ (extension fields)



Ring operations

- Addition:
$$\square(a+b) = \square(a) + \square(b) = g(a + b) \bmod m$$
- Multiplication:
$$\square(a) \cdot \square(b) = g^2 ab \neq \square(a \cdot b) \bmod m$$
- Define alternative *-Multiplication:
$$\square(a) * \square(b) = (ga \cdot gb) / g \bmod m = \square(a \cdot b)$$
- Note: Division needs to occur strictly before modular reduction step!
- Also: Division is costly and sits on critical path

Error Model

- Assumption of additive errors that may be introduced by an attacker, e.g. through light-attack with focussed laser beam
- Let $A = \square(a)$, $B = \square(b)$ and e_A, e_B error terms

$$\begin{aligned}C' &= (A + e_A) \star (B + e_B) \\&= (g^2 \cdot a \cdot b + g(a \cdot e_B + b \cdot e_A) + e_A \cdot e_B) / g \pmod{m} \\&= C + a \cdot e_B + b \cdot e_A + \frac{e_A \cdot e_B}{g} \pmod{m} \\&= C + e_C\end{aligned}$$

- Error detection through reduction mod s (but outside of critical path!)



Idempotent Scaled Embedding

- Find idempotent generator $g=g^2 \pmod m$
- Arithmetic AN codes (Proudler 1989)
- Same principle applies to binary fields $GF(2^k) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$
- However, one-sided error masking flaw due to distributive law:

$$\begin{aligned}A' &= \phi_i(a) + e_A \\B &= \phi_i(b) \\A' \cdot B &= (g \cdot a + e_A)(g \cdot b) \pmod m \\&= g^2 \cdot a \cdot b + g \cdot b \cdot e_A \pmod m \\&= \phi_i((a + e_A)b)\end{aligned}$$

Idempotent AN+B codes

- Exist whenever scaling factor s co-prime with field modulus p
- Define scaling factor g and constant term c :
$$g = (s^{-1} \bmod p) s$$
$$c = (p^{-1} \bmod s) p$$
- g, c idempotent and $g \cdot c = 0 \bmod m$
- $\square(a) = ga + c \bmod m$
- Use only for multiplication, since addition is no longer preserved by AN+B codes
- Again, also applies to extension fields

Multiplication

- Re-define *-Multiplication as

$$\begin{aligned}A \star B &= (g \cdot a + c) \cdot (g \cdot b + c) - c \pmod{m} \\ &= g^2 \cdot a \cdot b + c \cdot g(a + b) + c^2 - c \pmod{m} \\ &= \phi_i(a \cdot b) = g(a \cdot b) \pmod{m}\end{aligned}$$

- Conversion from AN to AN+B codes only necessary between heterogeneous operations.
- AN+B codes no longer mask one-sided errors like AN codes do:

$$\begin{aligned}A' \star B &= (g \cdot a + c + e_A)(g \cdot b + c) - c \pmod{m} \\ &= g(a \cdot b) + e_A(g \cdot b + c) \pmod{m} \\ &\equiv e_A \pmod{s}\end{aligned}$$

Undetectable Errors

- Addition: $e_A = -e_B \pmod s \rightarrow e_C = 0 \pmod s$

- Occurs with probability $1/s^2$

- Multiplication:

$$\begin{aligned} A' \star B' &= (g \cdot a + e_A + c) \cdot (g \cdot b + e_B + c) - c \pmod m \\ &= g(a \cdot b) + e_A(g \cdot b + c) + e_B(g \cdot a + c) + e_A \cdot e_B \pmod m \\ e_{R\star} &= e_A(g \cdot b + c) + e_B(g \cdot a + c) + e_A \cdot e_B \pmod m . \end{aligned}$$

- Since $g=0 \pmod s$ and $c=1 \pmod s$ we have $e_{R\star} = e_A + e_B + e_A \cdot e_B \pmod s$.

- Undetectable with probability of $\phi(s)/s^2$ (ϕ : Euler totient function)



Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance

- Error detection only, no correction. But operation replay a possibility, if operands still available.
- Can be implemented as check for $C=0 \pmod s$ (possibly beside the main data-path)
- Requires full modular reduction by s (no special prime), but outside the critical path in HW, or only periodically in SW.
- Can only handle transient faults gracefully, permanent faults not correctable

Review: Cyclic Binary and Arithmetic Codes

- Cyclic codes: principal ideals generated by divisors of $x^n-1 \pmod q$
- If symbol $(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{n-1}) \in C$, then shifted symbol $(x_{n-1}, x_0, \dots, x_{n-2}) \in C$, any valid symbol multiplied by any polynomial is again a valid symbol.
- Arithmetic codes have similar properties, except that carries come into play and require a different interpretation of minimum distance
- Scaled embedding is identical to computing with cyclic or arithmetic codes, if
 - $m=2^n-1$ or $m(x)=x^n-1$ ($q=2$)
 - $s=m/p$ (p is determined through factorization of m)
- Unfortunately cyclic codes too restrictive for embedding large extension fields of size $100 < k < 500$ (requires large irreducible polynomial)
- Only few suitable parameters (d is design distance):

n	263	359	383	479	503	719	839	863	887	983
k	131	179	191	239	251	359	419	431	443	491
δ	8	9	9	13	9	11	11	9	9	11



Extended Parameter Sets

- Allow m to have pseudo-Mersenne form: $m=2^n \pm u$ or $m(x)=x^n \pm u(x)$, with weight u small, e.g. $u=3,5,9,\dots$
- Still very efficient modular reduction, only a few extra adds
- Better chance of finding suitable parameters yielding large irreducible factors or primes (see paper appendix for examples)
- No longer purely cyclic codes, but rather “accumocyclic” codes
- Code family not reported in literature



Conclusions

- Scaled embedding based ring homomorphism are a lightweight method for error detection in finite field arithmetic
- Large possible range of scaling factors for trade-offs between performance and redundancy
- Drawback:
 - Choice of field somewhat dependent on factorization of scaled modulus
 - Not all errors can be detected equally likely
 - Probability of detection is only dependent on error pattern, but not data.
- Future work: Characterization of “Accumocyclic” codes wrt minimum-/design-distance



Thanks for your attention!

Any questions?