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# A High-Performance Fault Diagnosis Approach for the AES SubBytes Utilizing Mixed Bases

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Presented by

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# Outline

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- Introduction
- The Advanced Encryption Standard
- Presented Fault Detection Scheme
- Complexity Analysis
- ASIC Implementations and Comparison
- Conclusions



# Introduction

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
- The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the current NIST standard used for secure communications
- Faults in the AES
  - Natural faults
  - Malicious faults injected by attackers
- Effective fault detection schemes
  - Acceptable error coverage
  - Low overhead in terms of area and delay

# Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

**AES-128**



- 128-bit plaintext/key
- 10 rounds
- 4 transformations





# S-box

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- The nonlinear and most complex transformation among those in the encryption of the AES is the **S-boxes**.
- The S-box consists of **multiplicative inversion** and **affine transformation**.
- Most commonly are implemented using **look-up tables** and **composite fields** in hardware.



# S-box in Hardware

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
## – Look-up Tables (LUTs)

- Not preferred for high performance applications
  - Because of **high area** and the fact that unbreakable delay of the LUTs **cannot be pipelined**

## – Composite Fields


- **Low area**, can be **sub-pipelined**
- Most commonly are based on **polynomial, normal, and mixed bases**

# S-box Using Composite Fields




(a)

**Polynomial basis**



(b)

**Normal basis**



(c)


$M_4$   $S_4$  : Multiplication and Squaring in  $GF(2^2)^2$  polynomial basis

$\hat{M}_4$   $\hat{\lambda}$   $\hat{I}_4$  : Multiplication (by constant) and inversion in  $GF(2^2)^2$  mixed basis


**Mixed bases**

[28] Y. Nogami, K. Nekado, T. Toyota, N. Hongo, and Y. Morikawa, "Mixed Bases for Efficient Inversion in  $F_{((2^2)^2)^2}$  and Conversion Matrices of Sub-Bytes of AES," *In Proc. of CHES '10*, pp. 234-247, Aug. 2010.


# Previous Works



Redundancy-based




Parity-based



Multiplication-based

# Proposed Fault Detection Scheme




## S-box in mixed basis structure

- The operations are divided into 3 blocks.
- 5 predicted parities (error flags) are obtained for the entire operations.



# Fault Detection Scheme (cont.)

The predicted parity is obtained as the function of the inputs



Error indication for each block used in the fault detection scheme.

# Parity Predictions

**Theorem:** *The parity predictions for the 3 blocks of the S-box using mixed basis in the presented fault detection scheme are as follows:*

$$\hat{P}_1 = x_6(x_7 + x_5 + x_0) + x_5Z_3 + x_4(Z_7 + Z_1 + x_2) + x_2(\overline{x_5 + x_3}) + x_1Z_1 + (x_7 \vee x_4) + (x_5 \vee x_1),$$

$$\hat{P}_2 = x_6(Z_4 + x_1 + x_0) + x_4\overline{Z_6} + x_3x_7 + x_0Z_2 + (x_7 \vee x_5) + (x_2 \vee x_1),$$

$$\hat{P}_3 = (\gamma_3\gamma_1 \vee \gamma_2) + \gamma_3\gamma_2\gamma_0,$$

$$\hat{P}_4 = \theta_3(Z_4 + Z_3 + x_6) + \theta_2(Z_8 + x_4) + \theta_1(Z_6 + x_6) + \theta_0(Z_5 + Z_2 + x_2),$$

$$\hat{P}_5 = \theta_3(Z_8 + Z_4) + \theta_2(Z_7 + x_7) + \theta_1(Z_9 + Z_5) + \theta_0(Z_5 + x_7 + x_1),$$

where  $Z_1 = x_3 + x_0$ ,  $Z_2 = x_5 + x_1$ ,  $Z_3 = Z_2 + Z_1$ ,  $Z_4 = x_7 + x_2$ ,  $Z_5 = x_6 + x_3$ ,  $Z_6 = Z_1 + x_5$ ,  $Z_7 = x_6 + x_1$ ,  $Z_8 = Z_7 + x_0$ , and  $Z_9 = Z_5 + Z_2$ .

# Parity Predictions (Other Variants)

Based on the **reliability requirements** and **available resources**, one may use different number of predicted parities, e.g., merging the ones for the first and last blocks:

$$\hat{P}_{1+2} = \eta_7(\eta_3 + \eta_1) + \eta_6(\eta_2 + \eta_0) + \eta_5\eta_3 + \eta_4\eta_2 + \eta_7 + \eta_4 + \eta_3 + \eta_0,$$

$$\hat{P}_{4+5} = \theta_3(\eta_6 + \eta_5 + \eta_3 + \eta_2 + \eta_1) + \theta_2(\eta_7 + \eta_6 + \eta_4 + \eta_3 + \eta_0) + \theta_1(\eta_7 + \eta_5 + \eta_3 + \eta_1 + \eta_0) + \theta_0(\eta_6 + \eta_4 + \eta_2 + \eta_1).$$

# Error Simulations

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## Error Model:

- In this paper, we use **stuck-at error model**. The objective in using this model is to cover the **malicious** and **natural** errors caused by bit flips.
- In fault attacks, single error injection is the **ideal case** for gaining the maximum information. Nevertheless, due to technological constraints, a more **realistic error model** is to inject multiple errors.

## Our Scheme:

- Single stuck-at errors happening at the output of each S-box block are covered 100% in the proposed scheme.
- We have used LFSRs for multiple random error injections.
- After injecting 200,000 multiple errors, the error coverage of close to 100% is obtained.



# Performance Comparison on ASIC

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- We have used the **STM 65-nm** CMOS standard technology.
- VHDL has been used as the design entry for different fault diagnosis approaches.
- The **Synopsys Design Compiler** has been utilized for specifying the constraints and performing the synthesis.



# Performance Comparison on ASIC

Scheme	Area		Frequency		Throughput (Gbps)	Efficiency ( $\frac{Mbps}{\mu m^2}$ )	EC
	( $\mu m^2$ )	Overhead	(MHz)	Overhead			
Redundancy [9], [15]	$52.3 \times 10^3$ GE: $26.1 \times 10^3$	100%	813	107%	6.5	0.12	100%
Parity-based scheme in [14] (256 × 9 LUT)	$29.5 \times 10^3$ GE: $14.7 \times 10^3$	13%	1,620	4%	12.9	0.44	50% (SubBytes)
Parity-based scheme in [11] (512 × 9 LUT)	$57.1 \times 10^3$ GE: $28.5 \times 10^3$	119%	1,470	15%	11.7	0.20	50%
Multiplication approach in [13] (excluding affine)	876 GE: 421	25%	532	22%	4.3	4.91	75%
Parity-based scheme in [21] (polynomial basis)	958 GE: 461	37%	555	17%	4.4	4.63	97%
<b>Parity-based proposed scheme (mixed bases)</b>	996 GE: 479	33%	625	16%	5.0	5.02	97%

GE: Gate equivalent in terms of 2-input NAND gates.

[9] R. Karri, K. Wu, P. Mishra, and K. Yongkook, "Fault-based Side-Channel Cryptanalysis Tolerant Rijndael Symmetric Block Cipher Architecture," *In Proc. of DFT '01*, pp. 418-426, 2001.

[11] G. Bertoni, L. Breveglieri, I. Koren, P. Maistri, and V. Piuri, "Error Analysis and Detection Procedures for a Hardware Implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard," *IEEE Trans. Computers*, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 492-505, 2003.

[13] M. Karpovsky, K. J. Kulikowski, and A. Taubin, "Differential Fault Analysis Attack Resistant Architectures for the Advanced Encryption Standard," *In Proc. of CARDIS '04*, vol. 153, pp. 177-192, Aug. 2004.

[14] K. Wu, R. Karri, G. Kuznetsov, and M. Gossel, "Low Cost Concurrent Error Detection for the Advanced Encryption Standard," *Proc. Int'l Test Conf. '04*, pp. 1242-1248, Oct. 2004.

[15] C. H. Yen and B. F. Wu, "Simple Error Detection Methods for Hardware Implementation of Advanced Encryption Standard," *IEEE Trans. Computers*, vol. 55, no. 6, pp. 720-731, June 2006.

[21] M. Mozaffari Kermani and A. Reyhani-Masoleh, "A Low-Power High-Performance Concurrent Fault Detection Approach for the Composite Field S-box and Inverse S-box," *To appear in IEEE Trans. Computers, preprint*.



# Conclusions

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- We have presented a lightweight concurrent fault detection scheme for the composite field realization of SubBytes using mixed basis.
- The presented fault detection scheme has low area cost and negligible degradation in the frequency (reaching the efficiency of 5020 Gbps/mm<sup>2</sup> while maintaining the throughput of 5 Gbps).
- The presented scheme has the error coverage of close to 100% for the entire SubBytes, suitable for secure environments.
- The presented scheme is also applicable for the inverse S-box and the merged structures.

Thank you!