



# Differential Fault Intensity Analysis


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**FDTC 2014**


This research was supported in part by NSF Grant 1441710

- 1. DFIA vs DFA?**
- 2. Explaining Biased Faults**
- 3. An Attack Based on Fault Bias**
- 4. Experiments**
  - Fault Bias Exists**
  - DFIA Demonstration**
- 5. Related Work and Conclusions**


# Differential Fault Analysis (DFA)




# Implementations and Actual Faults





# Differential Fault Intensity Analysis (DFIA)




# Where do Biased Faults come from?




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## Clock Glitching





$$P_{\text{fault}}(Q3) > P_{\text{fault}}(Q2) > P_{\text{fault}}(Q1) > P_{\text{fault}}(Q0)$$



# Where do Biased Faults come from?




## Voltage Starving



$$P_{\text{fault}}(Q3) > P_{\text{fault}}(Q2) > P_{\text{fault}}(Q1) > P_{\text{fault}}(Q0)$$

- **Non-uniform propagation time results in non-uniform fault response.**
- **Varying *Fault Intensity* [Li 2010] will trigger non-uniform faults. We call this *Fault Bias*.**
- **Fault Bias is the basis of DFIA.**

# Using Biased Faults for Cryptanalysis




**Given:**  $C, C'$  for a given fault bias  $B$  (1-bit, 2-bit, ...)

**Find:** number of keys that result in a solution for


$$C' = \text{SBOX}(S') \text{ xor } K, C = \text{SBOX}(S) \text{ xor } K$$

for all  $S, S'$  where  $\text{HD}(S, S') \leq B$


# Key uncertainty for **single** biased fault




# Key uncertainty for **dual** biased fault



# Key uncertainty for **triple** biased fault



# Hypothesis Test with Biased Faults



**Given:**  $C$ ,  $C'$  for a known fault bias  $B$


**Find:** most likely key byte  $K$

For all  $\tilde{K}$ , find  $S' = \text{SBOX}^{-1}(C' \text{ xor } \tilde{K})$

Accumulate  $\rho_{\tilde{K}} = \sum(\text{HD}(S', S))$

Select  $K = \text{argmin } \rho$


# Experimental Setup




- **FPGA: Altera Cyclone IV (DE2-115)**
- **Agilent 81110A Pulse/Pattern Generator**



# Biased Fault Behavior for Sbox




# Experimental Setup for AES





(a)



(b)





# DFIA on AES



# DFIA Steps on AES



# DFIA Steps on AES



# DFIA Results on AES

- **AES DFIA when injecting a single-byte fault in round 9**
  - **4.6 fault injections to retrieve 1 key byte (90 exp)**
  - **68 fault injections to retrieve all key bytes (3 exp)**
- **AES DFIA when injecting multiple single-byte faults in round 9**
  - **Fault analysis at 24 clock frequencies between 100MHz and 330 MHz**
  - **7 fault injections to retrieve AES key (1 exp)**

- **DFIA is similar to DPA, uses fault bias as a source of side-channel leakage**
- **Unlike FSA [Li], DFIA does not require **data dependency on fault sensitivity**. It uses fault bias and associated differential effects.**
- **Several recent attacks [Fuhr FDTTC 13, deSantis LightSec 14] use **bias on the faulty state**.**
  - **DFIA does not require bias in the faulty state.**
  - **DFIA is experimentally demonstrated.**

- **DFIA requires slightly more faults than some other round-9 fault attacks**
- **On the other hand, DFIA only uses a loose fault injection requirement, and assumes only the presence of fault bias**
- **Future efforts:**
  - **Apply DFIA to other Algorithms**
  - **Apply DFIA to Software Platforms**
  - **DFIA Countermeasures**