

# Clock Glitch Attacks in the Presence of Heating

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ICIS – Digital Security Group,  
The Netherlands*

<sup>2</sup> *Graz University of  
Technology  
IAIK, Austria*

# Previous Work

CLOCK GLITCHING

TEMPERATURE

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| 2013  | —→ | 6. Hutter & Schmidt, temperature attack on RSA (temp. > 125°)      |



# What's to come?



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
# What's to come?

- Increased Temp. —> new faults
- Increased Temp. —> increased time frame
- Insert new instructions to program flow
  - Repeat instructions within the program flow



# Outline

- Experimental setup
  - Glitch generation
  - Evaluation process
- Results
  - Types of faults generated
  - Effect of heat
- Summary


# Experimental Setup




# Experimental Setup



# Target Microcontroller




- 8 – bit AVR
- 32 internal general purpose registers
- Up to 16 MHz with external clock



[\*][http://www.atmel.com/Images/Atmel-2513-8-bit-AVR-Microcontroller-ATmega162\\_Datasheet.pdf](http://www.atmel.com/Images/Atmel-2513-8-bit-AVR-Microcontroller-ATmega162_Datasheet.pdf)




# Glitch Generation




[13] M. Agoyan et al.:  
 “When Clocks Fail: On Critical  
 Paths and Clock Faults,” in  
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 chip glitchy-clock generator and  
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


# Glitch Generation



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# Evaluation Process




# Evaluation Process

- Wrap 'Inst' between 'NOP' instructions
- Induce clock glitch at execution phase
- Read out entire register bank


# Evaluation Process

- Initialize registers with another known set
- Wrap 'Inst' between 'NOP' instructions
- Induce clock glitch at execution phase
- Read out entire register bank

# Types of Faults - 1 (Inc.)




# Types of Faults - 1 (Inc.)



```
reg_12 = 108
reg_13 = 109
reg_14 = 110
reg_15 = 111
reg_16 = 102
reg_17 = 0
reg_18 = 114
reg_19 = 115
reg_20 = 116
reg_21 = 117
```

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


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reg_12 = 108  
reg_13 = 109  
reg_14 = 110  
reg_15 = 111  
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```

```
reg_12 = 108  
reg_13 = 109  
reg_14 = 110  
reg_15 = 111  
reg_16 = 148  
reg_17 = 0  
reg_18 = 114  
reg_19 = 115  
reg_20 = 116  
reg_21 = 117
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reg_12 = 108
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reg_12 = 108
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reg_16 = 148
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reg_20 = 116
reg_21 = 117
```


```
reg_14 = 110
reg_15 = 111
reg_16 = 112
reg_17 = 113
reg_18 = 102
reg_19 = 99
reg_20 = 116
reg_21 = 117
reg_22 = 118
reg_23 = 119
```

# Types of Faults - 2 (Mod.)

- Modified instructions similar to the ones observed by Balasch et al. in FDTC'11 [6]
- **Note!** Glitch is induced in execution phase unlike [6]


Instruction	Opcode
ADD R16, R5	0000 1110 0000 0101
ADD R16, R4	0000 1110 0000 01 <b>1</b> 0
ADD R16, R20	0000 111 <b>1</b> 0000 010 <b>0</b>
MOV R16, R4	00 <b>1</b> 0 1110 0000 010 <b>0</b>
ADD R16, R14	0000 1110 0000 <b>111</b> 0
ADD R16, R12	0000 1110 0000 <b>11</b> 00
ADD R16, R13	0000 1110 0000 <b>11</b> 01

# Types of Faults - 3 (Repeat)







Program Counter	Instruction	Value of R16
n-1	NOP	112
n	ADD R16, R5	213
n+1	ADD R16, R21	74
n+2	CLR R4	74
n+3	LDI R18, 0xFF	74
n+4	NOP	74
n+5	NOP	74

# Types of Faults - 4 (Repeat)




Program Counter	Instruction	Value of R16
n-1	NOP	112
n	ADD R16, R5	213
n	ADD R16, R5	58
n+1	ADD R16, R21	175
n+2	CLR R4	175
n+3	LDI R18, 0xFF	175
n+4	NOP	175

# Results (10 MHz)




# Results (20 MHz)


$(d_2 - d_1) = 4 \text{ ns}$




$(d_2 - d_1) = 5 \text{ ns}$



$(d_2 - d_1) = 6 \text{ ns}$



$(d_2 - d_1) = 7 \text{ ns}$



# Summary

- First work investigating combined glitch and thermo attacks
  - Performed experiments on an 8-bit AVR
- Some types of faults are easier to induce due to increased time frame with heat

# Thank you!



## Questions?

**Bariş Ege**


**Digital Security Group (ICIS)**

*Institute for Computing and Information Sciences  
Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands  
.B.Ege@cs.ru.nl [www.cs.ru.nl/B.Ege](http://www.cs.ru.nl/B.Ege)*




# Appendix - A


$(d_2 - d_1) = 4$  ns



$(d_2 - d_1) = 5$  ns



$(d_2 - d_1) = 6$  ns



$(d_2 - d_1) = 7$  ns

