



LIRMM

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ÉCOLE NATIONALE SUPÉRIEURE DES MINES


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An Embedded Digital Sensor Against EM and BB Fault Injection

David El-Baze, Jean-Baptiste Rigaud, Philippe Maurine



- **Context**
- **Fault Model**
- **Detector Design**
- **EM and BB Detection Results**
- **Optimisation**
- **Next Steps**
- **Conclusion**



[1] A. Dehbaoui et al. Injection of transient faults using electromagnetic pulses - Practical results on a cryptographic system, IACR 2012

[2] K. Tobich et al. Yet Another Fault Injection Technique: by Forward Body Biasing Injection


[3] S. P. Skorobogatov et R. J. Anderson Optical fault induction attacks, CHES 2002

[4] L. Zussa et al. "Efficiency of a glitch detector against electromagnetic fault injection," in Proceedings of DATE 2014


[5] Possamai Bastos et al. A bulk built-in sensor for detection of fault attacks. In *HOST 2013*

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- D-type Flip Flops are one of the most sensitive gates against ElectroMagnetic Attacks [6]



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


- Grey Windows where DFF of the detector are the most sensitive.
- Blue Windows where DFF of the protected circuit are the most sensitive.


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Detector 1/2


- 4 self looped DFFs
- Specific initialisation values
- A set and a reset network




Cover all the transitions
and phase opposition



Detector 2/2




EM & BB Test Bench




Test Bench

FPGA (Xilinx)	Tech. Node	Frequency (Period)	# of detectors
Virtex 5	65 nm	100 MHz (10ns)	36
Virtex II Pro	90 nm	100 MHz (10ns)	34
Spartan 3E 1600	90 nm	50 MHz (20ns)	36



- 34 detectors regularly spreading
- AES as a circuit to protect
- UART as communication system

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
Probability to inject a fault in AES or in detectors
Spartan3 1600E / 50 Mhz

- **GP** (Good Position) : # of positions where the detectors are efficient :
the detection could block the output of the cipher (faulted or not).
- **BP** (Bad Position) : # of positions where the AES can be faulted without triggering alarm.
- **SR** (Success Rate) : Ratio of Good Positions over the total # of active positions = where something happens.


$$SR = \frac{GP}{GP + BP}$$

EM Results (here on Virtex 5)

of faulted ciphers
by firing position



of detections
by firing position




- Wide Detection Area, no sensor detection range.

SR = 94%

EM Results (Virtex 5)


Successful attacks not
detected : $47/467 = 10\%$

of successful attack
not detected




BB Results (Virtex 2)

of faulted ciphers
by firing position



of detections
by firing position




- Wide Detection Area, **NO undetected faults.**
SR = 100%

Table summarizing the success rates by attack and model of FPGA:

	Injection at rising edge			Injection at falling edge		
	Spartan3 1600E	Virtex 5	Virtex II Pro	Spartan3 1600E	Virtex 5	Virtex II Pro
EM Front-side	78 %			88 %		
EM Back-side		94 %	86 %		95 %	94 %
RBBI		100 %	100 %		100 %	100 %

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
Impact of the detectors' location



Virtex 5 Floorplan. Colors means number of triggering per sensor for a full map.

Impact of the detectors' location


of injections detected by detector



- **Selecting the most active detector**

Impact of the detectors' location


of injections detected by detector



- **Generation of the histogram of activity by ignoring the attacks detected by the previous sensors “fixed”**

Impact of the detectors' location


of injections detected by detector



- Iterate again until all the detections are caught.

Impact of the detectors' location

- **Results of optimisation against EM Injections:**
 - 11 detectors / 36 are enough to detect a the attacks



Next Steps

- **Tests against Power Glitches Injections (finalizing the experiments)**
- **Tests against Laser Injections**
- **Development of a Test Chip (ASIC).**

- **Proposal of an enhanced detector**
 - **Fully Digital and fully compliant with ASIC design flow**
 - **Small : 35 nand eq. / detector**

- **Efficient against at least two injection fault methods:**
 - **ElectroMagnetic Injections**
 - **Body-Biasing Injections**

 - **Power Glitch Injections (First results being analyzed)**

Thank you !